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Abstract. In a majority of cases observed in classrooms over the last several decades, what has gone
by the name “discussion” is not discussion, but rather an interaction better known as recitation. If one
sees this phenomenon as a problem, then an aspect of its resolution must be theoretical (as opposed
to empirical or pedagogical): What series of conceptual terms might we adopt such that recitation does
not pass for discussion? Such a theoretical response would have to address internal and external, or
subjective and intersubjective, phenomena to describe what it means to participate in an interaction
like discussion or recitation. Next the theory would have to explain the differences between interactions
such as discussion and recitation in robust terms. Finally, these robust differences would have to
prevent the “mistaking” of discussion for recitation, and vice versa. David Backer sets out to accomplish
these three goals in the following essay. The theory he builds relies on a distinction between two
psychological-affective states: dehiscence and melancholia. Backer argues that recitation forms a mass
through melancholic introjection of a single object, while discussion forms a group that dehiscently
introjects no particular object at all. The chief finding of this essay is that viewing discussion and
recitation through the mass-psychological lens offers a new way to examine what kind of relations of
influence and power form during classroom discourse and, specifically, the political significance of those
discourses.
Introduction
In their extensive study of classroom discourse, Martin Nystrand and his col-
leagues conclude that while there is considerable “lip service” paid to discussion,
what tends to occur during classroom discourse is something quite different: the
traditional chalk-and-talk pattern known as recitation. Out of their 872 observa-
tions of teacher–student discourse in 200 classrooms in the United States, they
found that less than 7 percent of 1,151 instructional episodes had one discussion.1
Earlier studies show how recitation has persisted as a form of classroom discourse
over time and space as well.2 There are two related issues here. First, there is a lip
service problem where discussion is announced but not enacted. In such cases, as
the Nystrand study found, teachers say there will be discussion in their syllabi or
course materials or at the start of class but then proceed to facilitate recitation. The
second problem, known as such since at least 1969, is the persistence of recitation:
recitation remains the default pattern of classroom discourse. These two problems
1. Martin Nystrand, Martin Wu, Adam Gamoran, Susie Zeiser, and Daniel Long, “Questions in Time:
Investigating the Structure and Dynamics of Unfolding Classroom Discourse,” CELA Research Report
(Albany, NY: National Research Center on English Learning and Achievement, 2001), 36. Other
studies in the last twenty years confirm this conclusion as well. See, for example, J. Nathan Swift, C.
Thomas Gooding, and Patricia R. Swift, “Questions and Wait Time,” in Questioning and Discussion: A
Multidisciplinary Study, ed. James Dillon (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1988).
2. James Hoetker and William P. Ahlbrand Jr., “The Persistence of the Recitation,” American Educa-
tional Research Journal 6, no. 2 (1969): 145–167; Susan Stodolsky, Teresa Ferguson, and Karen Wimpel-
berg, “The Recitation Persists, but What Does It Look Like?,” Journal of Curriculum Studies 13, no. 2
(1981): 121–130; and Courtney Cazden, Classroom Discourse: The Language of Teaching and Learning
(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1988).
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raise many questions for researchers of classroom discourse. Why does recitation
persist? Why does discussion get confused with recitation? How should we think
about and practice discussion and recitation? What do the lip service to discussion
and the persistence of recitation mean politically?
Educational theory is uniquely suited to address the last question. What is at
stake politically when recitation is the predominant form of classroom discourse?
What are the political consequences when a teacher says there will be discussion
but proceeds to facilitate a recitation? In the tradition of educational theory,
discussion promises liberal values and democracy since, among other things, it is
described as a free exchange of ideas among equal, rational individuals deliberating
in dialogue.3 Does recitation negatively influence this democratic promise? If a
teacher leads a recitation instead of a discussion, is democracy compromised?
Existing responses to questions like these typically follow a pattern. First,
they appeal to political theory. Second, they argue for a juxtaposition of classroom
discourse practices with that political theory. Finally, they call for an increase
in those classroom practices that amplify the presence, awareness, or instruction
of the particular political values associated with the practices. One example
of such a response is Walter Parker’s argument that listening and discussion
socialize students for democratic citizenship because these practices encourage
political friendship.4 Parker draws from Aristotelian political theory in arguing
that listening and discussion have a political significance in that theory, and calls
for their further integration into classrooms. But this argument can say very little
about the lip service to discussion problem. Appealing to political theory may not
make sense of the confusion or help to prevent it. This essay claims that a different
approach is required to address the politics of this lip service problem, one that
appeals to a theory about what happens during discourse rather than arguing that
a particular practice occasions political values.
Understanding classroom discourse in terms of group formation, or the dis-
tinct relations of influence and power that certain discourses create, is one such
approach. What kinds of groups do recitation and discussion form, and how do
3. John Stuart Mill, John Stuart Mill: On Liberty, ed. Michael B. Mathias and Daniel Kolak (New
York: Pearson, 2006); David Bridges, Education, Democracy, and Discussion (Windsor, UK: National
Foundation for Educational Research, 1979); Nicholas Burbules, Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and
Practice (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993); Walter C. Parker, Teaching Democracy: Unity
and Diversity in Public Life (New York: Teachers College Press, 2003); Diana Hess, Controversy
in the Classroom: The Democratic Power of Discussion (New York: Routledge, 2009); and Sophie
Haroutunian-Gordon, Learning to Teach through Discussion: The Art of Turning the Soul (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
4. Walter C. Parker, “Listening to Strangers: Classroom Discussion in Democratic Education,” Teachers
College Record 112, no. 11 (2010): 2815–2832.
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these group formations accord or conflict with political values? When addressing
problems like lip service to discussion, it may be best to take a fresh look at why
we characterize discussion as democratic and recitation as oppressive.5 This essay
proposes that we first consider the processes of group formation that classroom
discourses trigger and proceed to political characterization afterward. Though it
is not typically used for this purpose, mass psychology can parse what kind of
groups are formed by discussion versus recitation and thus take a fresh look at
whether discussion is democratic or recitation is oppressive, antidemocratic, or
otherwise. Mass psychology can therefore inform our thinking about the political
significance of discussion and recitation, opening up possibilities for the theory
and practice of classroom discourse.6
Consulting Sigmund Freud’s foundational work Massenpsychologie und
Ich-analyse (Mass Psychology and Analysis of the Ego), it becomes clear that
recitation tends to form a mass through melancholic introjection of a single
object.7 Extending Freud’s analysis with Jacques Lacan and more contemporary
mass psychologists such as Eugene Wolfenstein, we can see that discussion creates
a different kind of group through dehiscent introjection of no particular object.
In mass-psychological terms, a group discourse where all participants focus on a
single person creates very different relations of influence than a discourse where
participants focus on one another in heterogeneous patterns.8 This essay artic-
ulates a mass-psychological theory of these discourses in order to generate new
5. See Kris Gutierrez and Joanne Larson, “Language Borders: Recitation as Hegemonic Discourse,”
International Journal of Educational Reform 3, no. 1 (1994): 22–36. Paulo Freire’s banking model of
education is another clear example that I explore later in the essay. See Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the
Oppressed (1968; repr. New York: Continuum, 2007).
6. After World War I, Freud and the burgeoning field of psychoanalysis began addressing the ways that
groups affect psychic life (thanks to Chris Higgins for this helpful characterization of mass psychol-
ogy). For precedents on this usage of mass psychology, see Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of
Fascism (New York: Orgone Institute Press, 1954); Eugene Victor Wolfenstein, Psychoanalytic-Marxism:
Groundwork (New York: Guilford Press, 1993); Eugene Victor Wolfenstein, “Race, Racism and Racial
Liberation,” Western Political Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1977): 163–182; and Zvi Lothane, “Mass Psychology
of the Led and the Leaders: With Some Thoughts on Current World Events,” International Forum of
Psychoanalysis 15, no. 3 (2006): 183–192. For an early application to education, see Siegfried Bernfeld,
Sisyphus: Or, The Limits of Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). In general this
essay participates in the tradition of psychoanalysis and education upheld and set out by Deborah Britz-
man and Peter Taubman. See Deborah P. Britzman, After-Education: Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, and
Psychoanalytic Histories of Learning (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012); and Peter Taub-
man, Disavowed Knowledge: Psychoanalysis, Education, and Teaching (New York: Routledge, 2012).
7. Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, trans. James Strachey (London:
Hogarth Press, 1959). This work will be cited in the text as GP for all subsequent references. Note that in
discussing this book in the text I use a more literal translation of the original German title to emphasize
its focus on masses.
8. I address this focus on the form of discourse (rather than content) below, as well as the usage of
“recitation” and “discussion” as formal labels. I do not intend to reduce or ignore the complexity of
discourse by focusing only on the mass-psychological difference between one object of attention and
many objects of attention. Rather, I intend to make a specific claim about this difference in order to
inspire further thinking about discourse.
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Fig. 1. Traditional model of classroom discourse versus a Harkness model: the left side
depicts students attending to a single teacher, while the right side depicts students and
teacher attending to multiple objects.
ways of thinking about the politics of classroom communication, two examples
of which (Aristotle and Paulo Freire) are considered in the conclusion.
Two Figures
Let’s begin by observing an interesting symmetry between two diagrams.
Figure 1 is a picture used to distinguish Harkness teaching from “traditional”
models of teaching. Figure 2 is Sigmund Freud’s graphic representation of a mass,
which is a group formation where a series of individuals attend to a single object.
The symmetry exists between Freud’s mass and the “traditional” side of the
Harkness diagram on the left.
First, let’s examine Figure 1. Harkness teaching, which originated at the elite
New Hampshire boarding school Phillips Exeter Academy (although it is clearly an
Fig. 2. Freud’s depiction of a mass.9
9. This figure is from Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 91.
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outgrowth of the tradition of liberal arts seminars and dialogical, student-centered
pedagogy), is a style of classroom facilitation where the teacher, among other
important pedagogical moves, encourages students to speak to one another as
much as (if not more than) to the teacher.10 My reference to this pedagogical
approach, and use of the Harkness diagram specifically, is meant only to provide a
practical illustration of the argument to come. Other pedagogies, including many
activist pedagogies, place a similar value on there not being a single object of atten-
tion. The more salient point for my purposes here is what James Dillon calls the
“mix of moves” used during discourses like Harkness discussions.11 While he does
not mention Harkness teaching, Dillon distinguishes recitation from discussion
according to the manner and order in which teachers and students interact. He
argues that discussion should have a mix of moves in which different participants
address one another in different patterns. A recitation, for Dillon, has teachers ask-
ing more questions than students and following up student responses, with a high
number of teacher–student exchanges. Courtney Cazden calls this pattern IRE, or
teacher initiation, student response, teacher evaluation, repeat.12 During recita-
tion, students attend to the teacher because the teacher is the one that initiates and
follows up and initiates again. In a recitation, students’ eyes are directed toward
the teacher and their responses address the teacher’s words. Recitations have
other qualities as well, including short wait time, nonexploratory talk, low-level
teacher and student questions, high number of back-and-forths, high percentage of
teacher talk, and predetermined questions or materials under consideration. One
thing that most accounts of recitation have in common — independent of subject
matter, or content — is their description of the form of recitative discourse, which
is consistently depicted as the sort of group formation shown on the left side of
Figure 1. This is why I use a graphic from Harkness teaching as an example.
On the left side of Figure 1, the teacher, shown at the front of the room, is
the single object of student attention. The diagram shows lines connecting each
student to the teacher, depicting the way they address the teacher during dis-
course. They are seated in rows, the typical classroom formation for a recitation.
The image names this assemblage the “traditional” model, and for good reason:
as mentioned above, recitation has been shown to be the default educational
pattern in classrooms across contexts. Although there are vastly different forms
of discourse in schools, when thinking about what education looks like, from
primary school to graduate school to professional situations, something like
this single-object-at-the-front formation may come quickly to mind. This essay
focuses on the form of classroom discourse as opposed to its content. Using mass
10. See David I. Backer, “Listening for Discussion: The Conference Method or Harkness Pedagogy,” in
Listening to Teach: Beyond Didactic Pedagogy, ed. Leonard J. Waks (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2015).
11. James T. Dillon, The Practice of Questioning (New York: Routledge, 1990), 16; and James T. Dillon,
Using Discussion in Classrooms (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1994).
12. Cazden, Classroom Discourse, chap. 4.
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psychology to examine the content of what students and teachers say would be a
related (and fascinating) research project to pursue in the future; however, exam-
ining particular questions or topics or phrases uttered in classrooms is beyond
the scope of this analysis. Thus the term “recitation” itself is contingent. While
it will become important later when making political characterizations, whether
we call the discourse-with-a-single-object-of-attention a recitation or discussion
or conversation is beside the point at this stage of the argument. Still, for the
sake of the forthcoming analysis, let “recitation” refer to the classroom discourse
depicted on the left side of Figure 1 and “discussion” refer to what is depicted on
the right side of Figure 1.
What are the mass psychologies of these discourses? Notice that Figure 2,
aside from the labels naming each line and the different sorts of lines present,
is symmetrical to the left side of Figure 1. If you turn this image 90 degrees
counterclockwise, this becomes more apparent (see Figure 3).
There is a single outer object, marked as X. Beneath the X, the graphic shows
three vertical, solid black lines which represent distinct psyches attending to the
Fig. 3. Rotated view of Freud’s mass illustration.
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outer object. It therefore could also depict a recitation with three students, or the
first row in the class on the left side of Figure 1. Each solid line represents one
individual and the dotted line emerging from the topmost end of the solid line,
directed toward the outer object, represents that individual’s attention. Whereas
in other contexts this object X might be a painting, a pastor, or a dictator, with
each alternative having its own distinct mass psychology, we are examining a set
of students attending to a teacher, with whom they speak in a recitation. The other
lines in the diagram correspond to terms and dynamics in Freud’s theory of mass
psychology, which he articulates in Massenpsychologie und Ich-analyse. This
book examines why individuals behave differently in groups than they do when
they are alone. He argues that existing explanations for these group formations
are insufficient because they tend to rely on the notions of “suggestion” and
“suggestibility,” which refer to a state of vulnerability to influence, though none
of them explain exactly what being suggestible means (GP, 33). Freud asks, what
is going on when individuals get together and, upon forming groups, become
suggestible? The analysis developed in response to this question has become a
classic argument in group psychology and was therefore translated into English
under the title Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.
While the English title obscures this point, the use of Massenpsychologie in
the original German title highlights that the book contains a theory of masses.
This theory of masses draws from Freud’s previous ideas about the dynamics of
the ego ideal in the psyche through hypnosis, then goes further into the cathexes
of object desire and identification, and concludes with the processes of introjection
and melancholic ego-ideal replacement, each of which I explain below. In brief,
mass formation entails the partially hypnotic introjection of a single object into
a series of psyches that are attending to that object, melancholically replacing
each individual’s ego ideal with that object. This is the process of mass formation,
which I argue below is the type of group that recitation forms (independently of its
content). It will help to stay constantly rooted in the two figures from this section:
classroom recitation and discussion, and Freud’s diagram of a mass. Again, each
solid black horizontal line in Figure 2 represents a single psyche. For the sake of
this analysis, we will think of these lines as representing the students on the left
side of Figure 1. Each of them attends to the teacher, who is the outer object X in
Figure 2. Freud’s theory of masses holds that when a series of psyches attends to
the same outer object, the perceived object moves into the position of the psyches’
ego ideals. My claim is that this same process happens during recitation. What
does it mean for a perceived object — in this case, the teacher or recitation leader
— to “move” into the position of students’ ego ideals? Freud theorized that this
movement is a combination of three processes, which I explain in detail below:
1. object desire cathexis with the outer object;
2. momentary lifting of the existing ego ideal through partial hypnosis;
and
3. the melancholic introjection of the object.
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Cathexis–Hypnosis–Introjection
Freud observes that when many psyches attend to a single object, the resulting
relationship between each psyche and the object is like that between a hypnotist
and a hypnotized person, where the latter “is in reality unconsciously concen-
trating his whole attention upon the hypnotist, and is getting into an attitude of
rapport, of transference on him” (GP, 97). In hypnosis these two people face one
another, and there is a rapport between them. A transference occurs when an expe-
rience “awakens … a portion of [a person’s] archaic inheritance” (GP, 99), such
as experiencing someone else in terms of one’s Oedipal past. The hypnotized per-
son focuses their attention on the hypnotist in such a way as to transfer certain
kinds of meanings, expectations, and associations onto the hypnotist. As we will
see, mass formation is a partially hypnotic transference between participant and
leader: “hypnosis has a good claim to being described as a mass of two” (GP, 100).
The transfer happens through a cathexis. James Strachey, translator of the 1959
English edition of Massenpsychologie, explains that “cathexis” derives from the
Greek word meaning “I occupy,” and “means the concentration or accumulation
of mental energy in some particular channel” such that “the psyche’s libidinal
attention is directed towards, or rather infused into, the idea of some object in
the outer world” (GP, 55).13 A cathexis is a desirous attention with which a
psyche settles on some object. The cathexis issues out toward the object in the
world and ascribes significance to that object. In Freud’s diagram, the dotted lines
representing the perception of the outer object may also represent the psyches’
cathexes reaching out to settle upon the outer object and ascribe it with meaning.
There are at least two kinds of cathexis relevant to mass formation: object
desire and identification. The former is a direct desire for something, while the
latter is the desire to take the place of something in relation to an object of desire.
The classic Freudian example is a baby’s cathexes for mother and father. One
traditional iteration is that the baby desires mother and desires to take father’s
place, because mother’s attention goes to father (though other iterations are likely).
Parts of the psyche, such as the ego and the ego ideal, form over time through
frustrated object desires and identifications; these complexes form as a result of
sets of cathexes. While object desire is the simple libidinal attention toward a single
thing, “identification endeavors to mold a person’s own ego after the fashion of
the one that has been taken as a ‘model’” (GP, 62). The famous Oedipal complex
is the result of frustrated cathexes directed at people and things early in life, the
stereotypical case being object desires for the mother figure and identifications
with the father figure. Ordinarily, taboos and eventualities block and redirect these
cathexes. “Mourning the loss” of people and things the psyche loves but cannot
have, it does the next best thing: it sets up memorials to those people and things
within itself, incorporating certain qualities and behaviors as an ideal. The psyche
therefore behaves “melancholically,” with mourning and melancholia acting as
13. The analogy Strachey uses is an electric charge.
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poetic metaphors for the psyche’s everyday functioning and long-term formation.14
Freud writes about a young boy whose parents were concerned because he would
sit under the dinner table and meow like a cat, for example. It came out in analysis
that the boy had had a kitten and the kitten had died. Freud concludes that the
loss of the kitten compelled the young boy to memorialize it through imitation.
Having lost a loved object, a person may sometimes “transform themselves into”
the loved object, “replacing the ego” with that object’s qualities (GP, 65). The
boy did just that, a response that Freud would characterize as a case of mourning
through imitation.
But identification, in contrast to object desire, can have other consequences.
Qualities and contents can be introjected and placed within the psyche as memo-
rials of the lost object; this process, while mournful, is distinct from imitation.
These memorials can cast a shadow over the ego, under which the psyche feels a
kind of rage and sadness, a general melancholy. The falling shadow that forms as a
result of melancholic introjection is the origin of the superego/ego ideal, a part of
the psyche that is integral to Freud’s account of mass formation since it enforces
the embargoes and prohibitions to which the psyche holds itself accountable. Thus
there is a “piece” of the psyche that is
a critical faculty within the ego, which even in normal times takes up a critical attitude
towards the ego … [and] develops in our ego and comes into conflict with it. We have called
it the “ego ideal” … [which] gradually gathers up from the influences of the environment the
demands which the environment makes upon the ego and which the ego cannot always rise
to.… [T]he [ego ideal’s] origin [is] in the influence of superior powers, and above all of parents.
(GP, 69)
Over time, the psyche issues out cathexes as object desires and identifications,
some of which are frustrated. As the preceding passage describes, this ebb and
flow of frustrated identifications forms a complex aspect of the psyche out of
influences of the environment, incorporating qualities of people and things to
which the ego aspires. These are “superior powers” it has loved and lost, and that
it now memorializes. This is Freud’s account of melancholic introjection, and it
can be used to consider what happens during classroom discourse. In these terms,
students enter classrooms having melancholically introjected many different kinds
of qualities that compel them to be all kinds of things. When they sit down and
face the teacher during a recitation, they enter into yet another rapport that draws
forth a transference through cathexis in the teacher’s direction. What happens next
is similar to hypnosis.
In hypnotism, the hypnotized person cathects the hypnotist, who creates
the conditions for the hypnotized to sleep. But this sleep is not the same as
the dreaming sleep one experiences at night. What happens in this cathexis is a
transference of the ego ideal onto the hypnotist. In other words, the hypnotist is
14. I set off the terms “mourning the loss” and “melancholically” with scare quotes to flag that I read
them with Lacan as discursive metaphors for linguistic processes. See Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and
Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 64.
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experienced as the hypnotized psyche’s ego ideal. Since the ego ideal is a part of
the psyche that compels and commands the ego to be this or that, become this or
that, the command to sleep puts the ego ideal to sleep, but not the entire psyche.
The psyche experiences a removal of the ego ideal and deactivates the inhibitions
it enforces once this rapport is established, such that the psyche feels released
from those existing compulsions.15 Rather than holding one’s own puppet strings,
to use another metaphor, one briefly gives them over to someone else during
hypnotism. Freud uses the German word Aufhebung to describe what happens in
this “removal,” which, in Totem and Taboo, is translated as a “lifting” of certain
“embargoes on the whole world” (that is, the contents of the ego ideal).16 The
hypnotist has become the ego ideal, since, in the transference, the psyche has
cathected and now melancholically incorporates the hypnotist, who commands
it to sleep. In the case of social and political formations like churches and armies,
however, where there is a leader or a leading idea that many psyches cathect and
introject, there is not a fully hypnotic relation between the outer object and the
psyches. There is, rather, a “partial” hypnosis since the purpose of their gathering
or communicating is not hypnosis itself but something else.
The consequent reaction of the psyche is not to fully relax or sleep but instead
to “replace” existing ego-ideal contents with some official set of contents, whether
it be church doctrine or army command. Thus the three-step process of cathexis,
partial hypnosis, and introjection forms a mass when multiple psyches introject
the same leader by replacing their ego ideals with that leader. Figure 2 depicts
this movement of the leader into the ego-ideal position. The same process can be
applied to understand recitation through the lens of mass psychology.
The Mass Psychology of Recitation: Melancholia
Depending on the students’ comportment, development, and/or histories of
trauma and fulfillment, the process can begin within the first few seconds of
class. They sit, do certain things to settle into their seats, and look forward.
The teacher begins speaking and the students focus their attention. The cathexes
reach out, existing ego-ideal contents lift, and the psyches become partially
hypnotized as they undergo a process of brief educational introjection, with which
the teacher proceeds to work through the day’s lesson. The teacher initiates
through some comment or question, one student in the mass responds, the teacher
says “interesting” or “good” or “okay” or “try again” or something like that, and
then the teacher repeats the script. Recitation is under way.17
15. In the Massenpsychologie Freud is specifically concerned with “removal (Aufhebung) of those
inhibitions (Triebhemmungen) upon [the mass participant’s] instincts (Trieben)” (GP, 33).
16. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and
Neurotics, trans. A. A. Brill (New York: Moffat, Yard, 1918), 46.
17. This is a simple fable of what happens in classrooms, but of course this is rarely how things go. It is
merely meant to show that the language of cathexis, lifting, and introjection can help us think about the
mass psychology of classroom discourse.
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This brief sketch is enough to articulate the mass psychology of recitation.
Returning to Figure 2, the arching arrows that bring the perceived object to the
ego ideal do so through the processes of identificatory cathexis of the outer object
(teacher), substituting students’ existing ego ideals, and introjecting the teacher
by incorporating the teacher into their ego ideals through partial hypnosis. The
students in a recitation form a mass when they move the teacher into the ego-ideal
position via cathexis, hypnosis, and introjection (in other words, the application of
Figure 2 to the left side of Figure 1). This mass is not the same sort of mass that
an army forms around a general or a church forms around the image of Christ, but
is instead a smaller kind of mass: the students form a mass around the teacher,
who commands their attention and works with the openings of their psyches just
enough for them to incorporate some lesson or other.
The next aspect of a mass (which is less important for our purposes) is that
each member of the mass identifies in their egos with the other members. The
dotted line between the egos represents this relation. Identification in the ego (as
opposed to the identifying cathexis of the outer object that leads to the ego-ideal
substitution) is an intensely ambivalent relation that can, at the same time,
produce feelings of connection and repulsion, as in sibling relationships. When
the ego ideal becomes uniform across psyches through introjection during partial
hypnosis, members of the mass become a band of brothers, or “brothers in Christ”
(GP, 40), Freud says. They may feel an intense connection with each other and
simultaneously feel aggressive toward each other.
In sum, then, the mass psychology of recitation has two relations: (1) a
partially hypnotic relation of each student with the teacher, which compels them
to melancholically introject the teacher’s image into their ego ideals; and (2)
an identificatory relation between students’ egos. At this point we have enough
language from mass psychology available to ask certain questions about the
political characterization of recitation, specifically, whether a recitation accords
with or contradicts certain political values like democracy. But before concluding
with those questions, we will articulate the mass psychology of discussion.
The Mass Psychology of Discussion: Dehiscence
Returning to Figure 1, the right side of the diagram is a Harkness discussion.
As I mentioned before, what is important about Harkness discussions is that they
emphasize a mix of moves, an equal and varied sequence in students’ focused
attention during discourse. Rather than attending to one object, the students attend
to many objects and voices in that moment, a dynamic that is illustrated by
the cross-hatched lines around the circular table. What is the mass psychology
of this mix of moves, as opposed to the homogeneous and unequal sequence in
recitation? The students cathect, but not a single object. The right side of Figure 1
illustrates this type of situation in which the participants do not perceive a single
uniform object. Their cathexes reach out as they would in any situation of focused
attention, but the process of cathect–lift–introject pauses. They introject nothing
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in particular.18 In discussion, the cathexes reach out to occupy a single object
as they would in a mass, but the transference of the partial hypnosis remains
unfinished at the second step: the “lifting” of existing compulsions occurs but
there is nothing in particular to replace the ego-ideal contents. This is in contrast
to the process that takes place in a mass: the psyche cathects, lifts the ego ideal, and
introjects new contents as it focuses upon the singular object. In a recitation, this
singular object is the teacher. The question, then, is what happens when existing
ego-ideal contents lift in rapport, but there is no forthcoming replacement? In this
lifting moment the ego ideal has deactivated, suspended, and it no longer compels
the ego to be this or that, become this or that.19 I propose that Jacques Lacan’s
notion of dehiscence describes this situation.
In his early essay on the mirror stage, Lacan writes that there is a “primal
Discord” at the heart of the human organism.20 In this “original tension,” a psyche
wants to know itself but cannot, taking as a compromise the closest thing it can
get to a full picture of itself: its mirror image and the images of people and things
around itself, incorporating these images into itself during the earliest cathexes.21
At this stage a baby will think that its reflection is itself in the mirror. Understand-
ing its reflection as being itself, it will come to think of itself as being identical
with that image (and other images, like parents or other people and things in its
environment). The baby is like an eye trying to see itself. While the eye might be
content with what it sees in the mirror or likenesses of the eye in books, a trouble-
some fact remains: the images and likeness of the eye are never the eye itself. The
eye can never be included in the visual field, Wittgenstein observed. For Lacan,
the same is true for the I: the self can never be included in the field of knowledge.
The psyche can never know itself fully, yet it wants to, so it fills the resulting gap
18. There are several possibilities for this introjection of nothing in particular. The students might
introject many voices and objects, no objects or voices, and/or a series of questions that may not be
officially answered or endorsed by a leader. Exploration of each of these options must be reserved for
further research.
19. Eugene Wolfenstein claims that in this situation “the group itself” is introjected
(Psychoanalytic-Marxism, 271).
20. Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic
Experience,” in Ecrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 78 (translator’s capitalization).
For a lucid account of Lacan’s early theories of the stadu du miroir, see Elisabeth Roudinesco, “The
Mirror Stage: An Obliterated Archive,” in The Cambridge Companion to Lacan (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 25–34. For more on Lacan and classroom discourse, see Paul Moran and Mark
Murphy, “Habermas, Pupil Voice, Rationalism, and Their Meeting with Lacan’s Objet Petit A,” Studies
in Philosophy and Education 31, no. 2 (2012): 171–181; and Daniel K. Cho, Psychopedagogy (Basingstoke,
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For more on dehiscence in education, see David I. Backer and Tyson E.
Lewis, “The Studious University: A Marxist-Psychoanalytic Groundwork,” Cultural Politics 11, no. 3
(2015): 329–345; and David I. Backer, Elements of Discussion (Charlotte, NC: Information Age, 2015).
The present analysis of dehiscence is limited due to constraints of space and theme, but it will be
extended in a forthcoming paper on dehiscence in education through discussion.
21. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the
Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954–1955, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1991), 166.
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with images and the symbols of language.22 Lacan calls this “Discord,” created by
a desire to know the whole self that can never be fulfilled, a “dehiscence.”
In anatomy, dehiscence refers to an opening in the body through which the
internal organs are visible but do not come out. In this sense, the dehiscence
is an opening in a body, otherwise whole, that reveals something which is
typically hidden (the organs), blurring the lines between inside and outside,
and thereby revealing the extent to which one’s image of oneself is limited. A
psyche in dehiscence is the same: a discordant gap opens, suspending the typical
understanding of what the psyche is and is not. Dehiscence names that gap between
what the psyche can know of itself and its unknowability. In later work Lacan
would elaborate on dehiscence, characterizing it as a moment when the psyche
loses a sense of what is and what is not, what is normal and strange, a kind
of “torn” quality of desiring psyches.23 In other words, as a desiring thing, the
known self is torn from the whole self, separated by the gap between what it
can know about itself and its unknowability. Therefore, in the earlier essay,
Lacan calls the dehiscence an “ecstatic limit of the ‘thou art that’”: a basic,
almost physiological separation between the self and its imaginary image, “an
organic inadequacy.”24 Like alienation, a process that recurs throughout life, the
dehiscence never goes away but rather returns again and again, since the psyche
is caught up in a continual process of trying to answer the question about itself
that it can never quite answer.25 In this way, dehiscence is an expression of one of
Lacan’s lasting contributions to the history of philosophy (which is to say, Freud’s
lasting contribution). Given the psyche’s organic inadequacy, Descartes’s idea that
I think, therefore I am, is highly problematic. The “primary Discord” between the
self’s knowledge of itself and its unknown aspects yields the opposite conclusion
for Lacan, who read Freud as ultimately troubling Descartes’s maxim. Based on
22. Dmitri Nikulin expresses this relation between the self and the mirror image eloquently in Dmitri
Nikulin, “The Man at the Mirror (Dialogue with Oneself),” Iris 3, no. 5 (2011): 61–79. For more on
“gap” in Lacanian psychoanalysis, see the entry for “Gap” in Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary
of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 72.
23. “The object is never for him definitively the final object.… But it thus appears in the guise of an object
from which man is irremediably separated, and which shows him the very figure of his dehiscence within
the world.… It is in the nature of desire to be radically torn.” Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book
II, 166. The passage, and the notion of dehiscence in general, deserves more specific attention and will
be the subject of a forthcoming essay on dehiscence in education through discussion.
24. Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic
Experience,” 79. I would like to thank the reviewers of this essay for the helpful phrasing of dehiscence
I present in this sentence.
25. Bruce Fink uses the word “alienation” to describe this feature of the psyche, but I suggest that
since, as Fink notes, “[this alienation] already appears in [Lacan’s] article on the mirror stage” as the
primal Discord mentioned in the previous passage, dehiscence should be conceived as the conditions
for alienation. See Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995).
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the psyche’s dehiscence, we might conclude that I think, therefore I am not.26
Dehiscence is the feature of the psyche that permits this conclusion.
The psyche in discussion, whose ego-ideal contents temporarily deactivate
without forthcoming replacement, is a psyche in dehiscence. It is a moment that
brings the psyche back to that primal Discord, its organic inadequacy. The mass
psychology of discussion is thus dehiscent introjection, a collective dehiscence
where nothing in particular is introjected after a cathexis has reached out and found
no singular leader or leading idea to replace the lifted ego ideal. One can see this
on the right side of Figure 1, where each participant has multiple lines emanating
from them rather than one. When the psyche introjects no object in particular, the
state of dehiscence initiated at the beginning of discourse continues as such, rather
than incorporating new content into the ego ideal via introjection. Thus discussion
is a group formed by dehiscent introjection of nothing in particular, as opposed to
the melancholic introjection of a single object that occurs during recitation.
Conclusion
The initial concern of this essay was to characterize the political significance
of discussion and recitation by articulating their respective mass psychologies.
The purpose of doing so is to develop our understanding of the kind of groups each
forms and thereby assess more accurately whether discussion is democratic and
recitation oppressive or otherwise. To summarize: recitation forms a mass through
melancholic introjection of one single object of attention while discussion forms
a different kind of group through dehiscent introjection of no object in particular.
Does a mass accord or conflict with democratic values? Does a dehiscent group?
Let these questions comprise one substantive contribution. Readers interested
in reevaluating the political character of classroom discourse now have access to
a distinction that may prove useful: recitations form masses, but discussions, if
they include a mix of moves, do not. At the very least, the problem of lip service
to discussion articulated at the outset is less likely to occur when this theory is
taken into consideration, since facilitators who are sensitive to the issue of mass
formation might not behave in ways that promote mass formation if their interest
is to avoid this outcome.
By way of conclusion, however, I will articulate two responses to the political
characterization question posed here. To do so I draw from a reading of one aspect of
Aristotle’s theory of democracy in Politics.27 Part of Aristotle’s idea of democracy
26. Derek Briton, “Learning the Subject of Desire,” in Learning Desire: Perspectives on Pedagogy,
Culture, and the Unsaid, ed. Sharon Todd (New York: Routledge, 2013), 62.
27. For contemporary perspectives on Aristotle’s theory of democracy, particularly with respect to group
formation, see Jill Frank, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005); Mathias Risse, “The Virtuous Group: Foundations for the ‘Argument
from the Wisdom of the Multitude’,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2001): 53–84; Stephen
G. Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2014); and Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community,
Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
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requires that people in a democracy “rule in turns” so that different people achieve
authoritative status. Although this exegesis is metaphorical at best given that the
passages from Aristotle refer to elections and not classrooms, it is still interesting
to see that Aristotle’s idea of democracy requires that those who exercise power
during democratic discourse must do so “in succession” and in such a way as to pre-
vent any one of them from holding the leader position longer than others. Further-
more, Aristotle’s language in the following passage illustrates dehiscence as well,
since he contends that when rulers rule in turns, they are “no longer themselves”:
Even among freemen and equals this is a principle that must be maintained, for they cannot all
rule together, but must change … in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan
they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and
the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And since it is better
that this should be so in politics as well … that equals should in turn retire from office and
should … be treated alike. Thus the one party rules and the others are ruled in turn, as if they
were no longer the same persons.28
The purpose for including this passage is to illustrate the usefulness of a
mass-psychological approach to classroom discourse when characterizing the pol-
itics of pedagogy. According to the metaphorical reading I propose, when Aristo-
tle writes “rule” above, we may read it as “speak,” and “govern” as “discuss.”
“Equals” and “freemen” refer to teachers and students, an idea with which many
might take issue both pedagogically and politically.29 On this reading, teachers and
students, when they speak in turns, discuss together as if they are no longer the
same persons, both in terms of their roles as the-one-who-speaks and as facilitator.
A classroom where speakers speak in turns, therefore, is a democratic classroom.
In this case, a democratic classroom discourse requires teachers and students to
“exchange occupations” as they pass the office of speaker to one another in a
mixture of ways. Just as, according to Aristotle, one person does not rule in a
democracy, one person does not act as the single focus during discourse in a demo-
cratic discussion.
This reading of Aristotle resonates with the mass psychology of classroom
discourse articulated here. A discussion with a mixture of moves satisfies this
democratic requirement, whereas a recitation with one person at the center of
attention would be monarchic. While a teacher might have democratic intentions,
the classroom discourse that teacher facilitates might be monarchic. A monarchy
in the classroom is not necessarily oppressive, but it certainly is not democratic.
Is monarchy best in classroom discourse? Some might think that democracy in
civil society is best achieved through monarchy in the classroom, but viewed
through the lens of the theory spelled out here, the mass does not meet Aristotle’s
turn-taking stipulation for democracy. I would argue that a monarchic classroom
28. Aristotle, Politics, 1261b. Aristotle reiterates the same claim at 1279a: “And so in politics: when the
state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think they ought to hold office
by turns” (emphasis added).
29. Pedagogically, it is controversial whether teachers are students’ equals. Politically, Aristotle’s theory
of democracy infamously comes with a notion of natural slavery.
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discourse may undo, dilute, and/or complicate other democratic features of a
teacher’s pedagogy. Furthermore, given that dehiscence is a kind of “ego-ideal-less”
state, Aristotle’s metaphor of exchanging occupations such that one no longer feels
like oneself is apt. In a mix of moves during discourse, according to the mass
psychology of discussion articulated here, participants may sense a deactivation
of that part of themselves which compels them to think they are thus and so, as if
they were no longer the same persons (read: no longer students). Dehiscence, from
this perspective, is a democratic mass-psychological phenomenon; melancholia,
which is encouraged by recitation, does not have the same democratic quality since
students will most likely continue feeling like students during a recitation.
This Aristotelian case is just one possible application of a mass-psychological
approach to the political characterization of classroom discourse. Another is an
augmentation of certain aspects of Paulo Freire’s theory of dialogue, hinted at
in a previous section. A pedagogy of oppression spreads narration sickness in
the classroom by following the banking education model, in which teachers fill
the empty minds of students as if they are making deposits into a bank.30 Mass
formation is a theorization of banking education, where melancholic introjection
replaces existing ego ideals with the object of the teacher. Narration sickness is a
sickness because it is partially hypnotic; the oppression is oppressive because it is
repressive, replacing students’ ego ideals through introjection. In dialogue, on the
other hand, teacher and students become teachers-students and students-teachers
for Freire. This blending of roles is another dehiscent situation, like Aristotle’s
exchange of occupations. Collective dehiscence in the classroom is the mass
psychology of dialogue. If this is the case, then we can claim that there is no
dialogue without discussion. Without a mix of moves, a monarchical classroom
discourse will compel students to introject a single object in place of their ego
ideals. Given the mass psychology of classroom discourse, a dialogical teacher
must facilitate a discussion in order to remain dialogical.
These are two kinds of conclusions we might draw from the mass psychol-
ogy of classroom discourse articulated here. The chief finding of this essay is the
mass-psychological lens itself: group psychoanalysis of discussion and recitation is
a fresh way to think about what is happening during those patterns of communica-
tion. Whereas recitation forms a mass through melancholic introjection of a single
object, discussion forms a group that dehiscently introjects no particular object
at all. This can help to distinguish what kind of relations of influence and power
form during classroom discourse, as in the Aristotelian proposal above, and offers
a new way to look at how to think through the political significance of those dis-
courses. Finally, the essay has accomplished one other thing. I began by citing the
trend noted by Nystrand et al. and others that recitations are taking place where
discussions are meant to occur — that is, that there is substantial “lip service” to
discussion. I hope this essay has communicated how different these discourses are
and what is at stake in confusing one for the other.
30. See Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
